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removal from executed prisoners—
presumably only somebody else’s gov-
ernment can abuse power!
In chapter three, Removing Trans-
plantable Organs of Capital Felons,
Palmer argues, in the light of the pre-
vious two chapters, for the moral
appropriateness of capital punishment
and of required organ donation.
The problem with this kind of argu-
ment of course is that, even if one
accepts capital punishment, it is only
appropriate if used in a perfectly fair
and accurate fashion. But no system
can guarantee this. The present
American system certainly cannot and
is “fraught with error” as documented
by the exoneration of thirteen (!) pris-
oners scheduled for execution in the
State of Illinois and the recent suspen-
sion of executions in that state.2
In the fourth chapter Palmer devel-
ops a quasi-scholarly constitutional
justification for his organ procurement
scheme. And in The Need for a New
Method of Execution he argues self-
referentially that: “Execution ‘by
anaesthesia-induced brain-death
would prevent destruction of trans-
plantable organs’” (page 71), and that
this method of execution should there-
fore be adopted. This too is highly
controversial. For whilst it is well
known that deep anaesthesia can
reversibly mimic brain death it is not
the same state. Physicians are always
careful to determine brain death in the
absence of anaesthetic influence.
Thus, while physicians can painlessly
remove the heart and other internal
organs from an anaesthetised person,
that would be unacceptable: an execu-
tion performed by physicians. It would
have nothing to do with brain death.
In the final chapter Palmer returns
to the theme of chapter three and
attacks the unfairness of capital
punishment—in my view, he should
have started and stopped here. Ameri-
cans have had enough diYculty trying
to get capital punishment “right”
without introducing issues of second-
ary gain into the execution process.
Let me present my biases. Major
organ transplantation eVectively pre-
vents premature death, albeit imper-
fectly with an expensive technology
still under development. Increasing
the organ supply is not as important as
improving the technology and de-
creasing the costs of transplantation.
But in the pursuit of this important
goal we must not trample on other
strong moral or medical considera-
tions. Palmer’s arguments for the
required use of organ transplants from
executed prisoners must be rejected.
They wish away centuries of govern-
mental abuse of power. They assume
that we can achieve perfect justice in
capital punishment—an assumption
all experience belies. They treat pris-
oners diVerently from others and
make prisoners more exposed in their
vulnerability, not protected. Finally,
they require intimate physician par-
ticipation in the act of execution.
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What is bioethics? For those involved
in the study or the teaching of bioeth-
ics this question is a fundamental one.
This book proposes a series of possible
answers to this question, converging
on the idea that bioethics is a myth.
As a whole, the book is a response to
the so-called French “bioethical” laws
(1994) and to the “bioethics” they
propagate. It is therefore, for the
French-reading English-speaker, a
good introduction to these and to the
debates around them.
Gérard Mémeteau, professor of law
and director of the newly established
Centre de Droit Médical at the Univer-
sity of Poitiers, documents in his arti-
cle on the one hand the inconsisten-
cies of the French legal approach, and
on the other his own regret at being
forced to admit these inconsistencies.
Reluctantly, he concludes that the tra-
ditional concept of the human being,
subject of positive law, is, despite the
aYrmation of “respect for the human
being from the beginning of its life”,
betrayed in the concrete norms gloss-
ing over the existence of human
embryos. In so far as this is precisely
what the laws propagate as “bioeth-
ics”, he calls it an imposture.
But is bioethics an imposture? This
is strong language for naming what is
commonly taken to be a discipline.
The book in fact introduces itself as
being against bioethics. Is it really?
Mémeteau’s point of view is nuanced,
by being seconded on the one hand by
Christian Byk, judge and vice presi-
dent of the Council for the Inter-
national Organisation of Medical Sci-
ences (CIOMS), and on the other by
Dominique Folsheid, professor of
philosophy at the University of
Marne-la-Vallé. Whereas Byk is more
positive in his approach towards
bioethics, Folsheid regards it not sim-
ply as “une imposture”, but—yes—as
a “monster”.
Byk writes: “Bioethics does not
explain and does not categorize the
phenomena. It analyses and discusses
them, it confronts them with our
knowledge as well as with our faith. It
trains us to exercise freedom and
responsibility, we who are ethically
incomplete precisely because ethics is
part of our history and our perspec-
tives. Then, stripped of misunderstand-
ings and beyond fashion, bioethics can,
like secularity, be a place of dynamic
confrontation of points of view. Not so
that one triumphs over another, but so
that we gain a clear view of the order of
things which we initiate by our doing
and which in turn will mould our
actions.” (My translation.)
To Byk, bioethics—a field in which
he has been a professional expert—is
not a branch of study in any traditional
way, like biology, sociology or philos-
ophy. His experience underwrites his
ability to analyse the nature of the
expertise required, an expertise which
he keeps at an ironic distance. He sees
the ethics committee, so frequently
appealed to as the last resort, as the
melting pot of several existing orders:
deontology, law, and social practice, or
simply as the pot where all kinds of
existing order melt, and whose stand-
ardised product is consensus. The
expert is the one who knows how to
produce the product sought. And,
after all, is the product so very bad?
Byk ends on a more positive note than
Mémeteau.
Dominique Folsheid, on the other
hand, is positively horrified. Folsheid
saluted bioethics in its coming from
across the Atlantic, as though it was
the salvation of academic philosophy,
and in particular of ethics. Welcoming
what he thought to be a carrier pigeon,
he woke up to having opened his arms
to a bat—a chimera with wings like a
dove and fur like a rat. Aye, the
creature would flap its wings in proof
of spirituality—it was after all
“ethics”—and display its fur too, to
convince “the inhabitants of the
american caves” that it was, like them,
delightfully beastly—it was “bio-” as
well. It would refuse to determine
itself as either an ethics of biology or a
biology of ethics and remain unclassi-
fiable as anything else but a living
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The dramatic language of Folsheid
produces a brilliant piece of sarcasm,
weird enough to become a classic
in—oh well!—bioethics.
The politicians Bernard Sellier and
Christine Boutin both contribute their
perspective on “bioethics”. Actors in
the process which, against their will,
has made “bioethics” a part of the Code
Civile, their keen retrospective criti-
cism also allows us to look forward.
The frustration which comes across as
a violent appeal must point in the
direction opposite to the controlled
pluralistic ideology of “la pensée
unique”, which makes of bioethics the
new framework of a totalitarian pop-
ulism. The contributions of Jean-
Francois Poisson, Michel Schooyans
and Lucien Israël reinforce the impres-
sion of a book against “bioethics”. But
what alternative is oVered? Beyond
polemics, it is both simpler and more
complex than bioethics: it is ethics.
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It is interesting, that with the notable
exception of the Cologne-based ge-
neticist Benno Müller-Hill, German
historians of medicine have not both-
ered a great deal with looking into
German medical history during the
Third Reich. We owe Pennsylvania
State University’s Robert N Proctor a
great deal of gratitude for uncovering
more and more of this history, and for
making it accessible in a highly
readable format. Proctor has estab-
lished himself rapidly as the pre-
eminent US American historian of
science on all aspects of Nazi medical
research and health policy. In this
most recent book Proctor looks at
Nazism’s pioneering contributions in
public health research and policy, as
well as in environmental health, occu-
pational health, and preventive medi-
cine. This book holds some disturbing
lessons for those who hold the view
that basically good people will under-
take ethical research, and support
good health policies, while bad people
will conduct medical research in an
unethical manner, and will work
against good health policies. We will
all probably be able to agree that Nazis
basically were bad people. Racists,
mass murderers and ideologues
propagating the superiority of the
German “race” are not likely to find
many friends amongst biomedical
ethicists or the wider community. Yet,
as Proctor shows, Nazi scientists were
the first to establish conclusively links
between smoking and lung cancer.
The Nazi regime’s leading figures ran
bitter campaigns against smoking. The
regime also established progressive
occupational health policies designed
to reduce the number of cancers
caused by occupational exposure to
asbestos, radium and uranium and
other carcinogens. Unsurprisingly,
perhaps, these policies did not apply to
prisoners of war, who were often
forced to undertake the most hazard-
ous work without adequate protective
clothing. Reich Health Führer Leon-
ardo Conti, the leading anti-tobacco
campaigner of the Third Reich, com-
mitted suicide after the war, while
awaiting his execution for another
leadership role he took up during the
Third Reich, the murder of intellectu-
ally and otherwise disabled people—
euphemistically described as the “eu-
thanasia campaign”.
Much of this book recounts battles
between Nazi quacks and Nazi scien-
tists, wrangling for the political elite’s
favours and support, medical re-
searchers creating ideologically suit-
able rhetorical frameworks to assure
that their work finds continuous finan-
cial support. The reader also learns
how progressive policies (for example
the anti-smoking campaigns) were
undertaken out of less than savoury
motives (ie to prevent the “Aryan”
genetic material from deteriorating, or
in order to keep soldiers fit for
combat). Hundreds of Germany’s
leading cancer researchers lost their
university positions, and often their
lives, because they were Jewish.
Proctor’s book serves as a timely
reminder that the Nazi regime wasn’t
a monolithic evil empire. He forces us
to recognise that diVerent interest
groups fought each other both with
regard to the direction of cancer
research, and with regard to the
“right” direction of public and occu-
pational health policies.
It is widely accepted today that ide-
ology inevitably corrupts scientific
inquiry in some fundamental sense.
However, it is also important to
recognise that ideologically corrupted
inquiries can still yield scientifically
sound research and research results.
As Proctor says: “Nazi inspired re-
search was often idiotic, but not
always” (page 257).
One last point Proctor makes is
addressed toward pro-life Christian
bioethicists. He warns them not to
compare Nazi “euthanasia” with “cur-
rent eVorts to allow people to choose
the manner and timing of their death”.
“Bioethical discussions”, he writes,
“are full of facile identifications of
Nazism with everything from abortion
and rationalised medicine to doctor-
assisted suicide”. This reviewer at least
couldn’t agree more.
This book is a rich source of histori-
cal information. Analytical ethicists in
particular, would be well advised to
have a closer look at the information
provided in this book. Flippant re-
marks such as roads are roads are
roads, no matter whether a Nazi or
someone else built them, turn shallow
when one looks at the broader histori-
cal and social context in which roads
were built by the Nazi regime, progres-
sive cancer research took place in the
Third Reich, and progressive occupa-
tional health policies were introduced
to protect the health of the German
people. So, even though this is not
explicitely a “bioethics” book, it un-
doubtedly holds many valuable lessons
for anyone with an interest in bioethics
and/or the history of medicine.
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